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Abstract
Was the outcome of the United Kingdom’s “Brexit” referendum to leave the European Union
a visible and consequential manifestation of right-wing populism? After all, skepticism in the
UK towards the European Union predates the recent rise of European right wing populism.
Original survey data show, however, that the interaction of nativist sentiment and anti-elitist
attitudes, the cocktail of right-wing populism, led to widespread support for Brexit, even
while controlling for other factors. While hostility to immigrants was an important factor,
nativists were particularly prone to vote “leave” if they also did not trust political elites, a
crucial element of populism. Further underscoring this explanation is the conditional effect
of anti-elite sentiment. The relationship between anti-elite sentiment and support for leaving
the EU only exists among those with high nativist sentiment; among those low in nativist
sentiment, anti-elite feelings did not increase support for Brexit.
∗This work was supported by Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) grants numbered [RES-061-25-
0405] and [ES/L011867/1]. This research has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under
the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No 682758). All errors
are our own responsibility alone.
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Introduction
The 2016 referendum decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union has been
heralded as one of the most visible examples of the growing strength of right-wing populism in the
advanced industrialized world.1 How do we know, then, that the Brexit decision was truly the
manifestation of right-wing populist sentiment? Euroskepticism is hardly new to the UK or the
Consevative party, and has been widespread on the right in the United Kingdom long before the
recent increase in support for right wing populist parties in Europe as a whole (Forster, 2002,
Norton, 1990, Evans, 1998). Recent research shows that both populism and anti-immigrant
sentiment, the core features of right-wing populism, predict support for Brexit individually
(Hobolt, 2016, Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). This is different, however, than showing the effect
of right-wing populism, which suggests an interactive effect between nativism and anti-elite
attitudes.
Using survey data from a multi-wave panel survey of British respondents, we find such an
interaction. Anti-elite sentiment increased support for Brexit by 17 percentage points among
those high in nativism, but anti-elite sentiment had no effect on those low in nativism. Those
with higher anti-immigrant attitudes and distrust of politicians had a predicted probability of
66% for voting to leave, whereas the same class of nativist voters with more muted anti-elite
feelings were largely on the fence, with a 49% chance of supporting Brexit.
What is Populism? What is Right-Wing Populism?
Much progress has been made in conceptualizing populism in recent years. There is now a general
consensus that populism is, in Mudde’s words, a “thin-centered ideology” that considers society
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people”
versus the “corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte´
ge´ne´rale (general will) of the people (2007, 23; see also Stanley (2008), Jagers and Walgrave
(2007), Canovan (1999), Elchardus and Spruyt (2016): 114). Authors note the strong moralistic
1“Britain allowed its populist right to rise”(The Guardian, 24 June 2016); “Why the far-right is growing in
the UK and beyond” (Independent, 31 May 2016); “Right-Wing Populism is Prevailing in Left-Wing Strongholds
Around the World” (The New York Times, 27 June 2016); “Populist Anger Upends Politics on Both Sides of the
Atlantic” (The New York Times, 24 June 2016)
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streak in populism. Elites are not incompetent and ineffective but rather disingenuous and self-
serving. Hawkins notes that populism is accompanied by a Manichaean discourse that identifies
Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite. The populist notion
of the General Will ascribes particular virtue to the views and collective traditions of common,
ordinary folk, who are seen as the overwhelming majority (2009, 3). Politicians and other elites
are thought by populists to be dishonest and profit-seeking. Because of this, populists endorse
more direct forms of democratic governance such as referendums that allow ordinary individuals
to circumvent “backroom deals and shady compromises” (Canovan, 1999, 6).
Populist ideology is thin in the sense that while it incorporates a set of substantive beliefs
about politics, it is not fleshed out enough to produce a specific policy agenda. It must be
connected to a particular type of adversary said to be taking advantage of the population as a
whole (Canovan, 1999, Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). Populism needs a focus for its animosity, a
foe generally thought to be in cahoots with political elites that is doing the people harm. This
adversary can vary enormously, and helps define whether a party or movement is a manifestation
of right-wing or left-wing populism (Elchardus and Spruyt (2016), Stanley (2008), Hawkins
(2009): 24). In the case of Brexit, finding an enemy to enemy to fill this role is easy and
straightforward—the EU and bureaucrats in Brussels.
The key element that seems to distinguish right-wing populism from other forms is its racial
and ethnic component. Mudde (2004, 2007) argues that right-wing populists are nativists who
claim to represent the true people who make up the true nation and whose purity is being
muddied by new entrants. He writes, “nativism is defined here as an ideology, which holds
that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group “the nation” and
that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous
nation-state (2007, 19). This gives right-wing populism its particular ethnic, cultural and racial
caste. Consequently, concerns about immigration are the clearest expression of right-wing pop-
ulism, many argue (Betz, 1994). Recently, Inglehart and Norris (2016) equate populism in the
advanced industrialized world with these kind of nativist beliefs. Nativism adds substance to
who is doing harm to the people, which in left-wing populism might be replaced by the enemy
of big banks or multinational corporations.
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It is important, however, to be mindful of the fact that nativist sentiments may be “populist”
in the sense that they assert the privileges, often thought to be unfairly fading, of the most
numerous racial, ethnic or religious group against newcomers (Gest, 2016, Elchardus and Spruyt,
2016, Parker and Barreto, 2014). However, nativism need not necessarily be linked with anti-
elitist beliefs. In other words, there is nothing inherently anti-establishment about a commitment
to a racially, culturally and ethnically homogenous society. Indeed authoritarianism – in other
words, deference to elites – and strong in-group identity generally go together (Altemeyer, 1981,
Graham et al., 2009). We define right-wing populism as the combination of anti-elitism and
nativist identity, arguing that this particular psychological cocktail was a likely driver of Brexit
attitudes.
Existing literature has explored the influence of nativism on European integration attitudes.
Some studies show that attitudes toward immigrants are the most important predictors of citi-
zens’ support for the EU (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005, De Vreese et al., 2008, McLaren,
2002, Azrout et al., 2011). More broadly McLaren (2002) argues that attitudes toward the Euro-
pean integration tend to be largely based on a general hostility toward other cultures; therefore,
individuals who are more concerned about national degradation perceive heightened threat to
national integrity from both domestic minority groups and the European Union. Goodwin and
Milazzo (2017) show the important role played by anti-immigrant sentiment in the Brexit de-
cision in particular and Hobolt (2016) also demonstrates that populism predicts support for
leaving the EU.
However, to say that right-wing populism had an effect on the Brexit vote implies something
more than the additive effect of nativism and anti-elite attitudes. To show that right-wing
populism affected the Brexit vote suggests an interaction. It implies that the effect of populism
and nativism in combination is stronger than the additive effect of the two. No study (that we
are aware of) looks at the interaction of anti-elitism and nativism, what we use for the purposes
of our paper as the definition of right-wing populism. Right wing populism is a constellation of
attitudes that should have an effect that is more than the some of its parts.
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Research Design
The data used in the analyses below come from an eight-wave panel study of Great Britain,
administered by the survey firm YouGov. The initial wave of the study was fielded in November
2011 (n= 2780), and the last wave was finished in April 2015 (n=2687; 978 of these final wave
respondents participated in both the first and final waves).2 While cross-sectional surveys have
limits in their ability to unambiguously demonstrate causality, the multi-wave design helps
considerably in this regard. Our key independent variables are measured early in the panel in
wave 2. We did not begin asking our key outcome variable until wave 5 (and we ask it in the final
four waves of the panel). Having our key independent variables come temporally prior (not by
minutes as in a typical survey but by months/years in our panel study) to our measures of Brexit
opinions helps make a much stronger causality case, particularly since we asked our nativism and
anti-elitism questions well before there was a concrete plan to offer a referendum. Consequently,
there is little reason to think that attitudes about a referendum on EU membership are causing
nativist and anti-elite sentiment.
Dependent variable: Support for Britain leaving the European Union
Our outcome variable examines support for the UK leaving the EU. Fortunately, the specific
wording of our question (first asked approximately three years before the June 23, 2016 referen-
dum) very closely matched the specific ballot paper. Specifically, we asked respondents “If there
was a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, how would you vote? Re-
spondents could choose ‘leave,’ ‘remain,’ ‘would not vote,’ or ‘don’t know’ (full question wording
is available in appendix A). We recoded these responses into a three point variable, where the
greatest values indicate a desire to leave the EU, the intermediate category a plan not to vote
or an undecided attitude, and the lowest value a desire to remain. In appendix B, we show that
responses to this question were remarkably stable over time and reveal just how closely divided
the outcome was always going to be.
2The YouGov sampling frame includes the three home countries of England, Scotland, and Wales, but excludes
Northern Ireland. Funding for the study was provided by the Economic and Social Research Council grant [number
redacted] to [PI redacted]. The panel was periodically refreshed with new respondents. Panelists continued to be
invited to take part in survey waves.
5
Anti-elitism
Our survey includes a large battery of questions on multiple dimensions of political efficacy
that allow us to measure populism. Our measure of anti-elite sentiment comes from a subset
of questions from a larger battery of political efficacy. While this subscale is often described as
capturing trust towards incumbent politicians generally (Craig et al., 1990), the simple converse
is that it shows distrust in politicians and therefore reveals sentiment against political elites. We
use an additive scale of four survey questions to measure this anti-elite sentiment, which form a
reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .77). Full question wording is available in appendix A. This
battery of questions was asked in the second wave (May 2012) of our eight-wave panel. 3
Nativism
Nativism is measured through a battery of ten Likert scale questions capturing attitudes towards
immigration, Islam, and non-white citizens in the UK. Opposition to immigration stands out here
because it is the most obvious expression of belief in an ethnically and culturally homogenous
people. The items create a clear one-dimensional scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .9). We use an
additive scale in our models. Full question wording is available in appendix A, but examples
are “The United Kingdom has benefitted from the arrival in recent decades of people from
many different countries and cultures?” (reverse coded) and “All further immigration to the
UK should be halted.” This battery of questions was asked in the second wave (May 2012) of
our eight-wave panel.
The interaction of nativism and anti-elitism
If Brexit was in large part a right-wing populist product, we expect that the interaction of these
variables will lead to high levels of support for leaving the European Union. To examine the
interaction between nativist and anti-elitist sentiment, we create a series of dummy variables by
3These questions capture the same sort of attitudes previously used to capture populism in other studies. In
a study of party discourse, Pauwels (2011) uses words such as ‘arrogant’, ‘promise’, ‘betray’, ‘disgrace’, or ‘truth’
to measure populism. A survey by Rooduijn (2014) asks respondents whether politicians are honest, reliable and
keep their promises in order to measure populism. However, we recognize that our measures capture only the
anti-elite elements of populism, not two other features: a belief in direct democracy and a faith in ordinary people.
Silva et al. (2016) note the centrality of inefficacy to populism.
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splitting respondents at the medians of these two variables to create four groups: those who are
low in both nativism and anti-elite sentiment (LN-LAE, the excluded or baseline category in the
statistical models); those who are low in nativism but high in anti-elite sentiment (LN-HAE);
those who are high in nativism but low in anti-elite sentiment (HN-LAE); and those who are
high in both nativism and anti-elite sentiment (HN-HAE). The distribution of these respondents
can be found in appendix C; all categories are well-populated. This categorization both eases
presentation of our interaction effects but also has a methodological grounding. As Hainmueller
et al. (2017) remind us, multiplicative interaction models are based on the crucial assumption
that the interaction effect is linear, which fails unless the effect of the independent variable
changes at a constant rate with the moderator. Indeed an analysis of our data reveal that our
data does not meet this strong assumption. Therefore we dichotomize our key independent
variables. We expect that those who are high in nativist sentiment will, on average, be more
likely to support Britain leaving the European Union. However, we expect that the effect of
anti-elitism will be sensitive to how nativist one is. More specifically, we expect that among those
who have lower levels of nativist sentiment, low levels of efficacy will not manifest themselves in
appreciably higher levels of support for leaving the EU. However, among those who have strong
nativist leanings, we expect that the added fuel of high levels of anti-elite sentiment should lead
to a significant increase in desire to withdraw from the EU. Importantly, each of these four
groups is sufficiently well populated for meaningful comparisons. In the table of ordered probit
results that comes later, we refer to abbreviations of these groups, which we present here for
easy reference.
Control variables
There is a large literature on the determinants of Brexit (Clarke et al., 2017), Euroskepticism
and Europhilia in member countries of the EU that helps us identify important control variables,
such as authoritarianism, ideology, globalization attitudes, economic sentiment and demographic
attributes. Full question wording is available in appendix A.
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Results
To analyze the effect of our independent variables on support for exiting the UK, we ran a series
of ordered probits. For each wave, we present two models. The first model for each wave only
includes indicator variables to identify the four key attitudinal subgroups. The second model
includes the full slate of control variables we discuss above. Results to these models are presented
in Table 1; Figure 1 presents predicted probabilities from the fully specified model using the
wave 8 data with all other variables set to their means.4 The baseline or excluded category
in all models are those who low in both nativism and anti-elite sentiment. The regression
coefficients and associated p-values for our indicator variables represent the difference between
that group (e.g. High nativist/High anti-elite) and the excluded category. The lower panel in
the table computes difference-in-means and associated standard errors and p-value for the full
set of pairwise comparisons..
Results conform to expectations.5 As expected, high-nativists are consistently more support-
ive of leaving the EU than are low-nativists. However, whether there is an effect from anti-elite
sentiment depends on whether one is in the high-nativist or low-nativist group. Anti-elite sen-
timent does not lead to an increase in support for leaving the EU among those who are low in
nativist sentiment in any of the 8 models. Yet, in all models there is a significant additional
effect on top of nativist sentiment for anti-elite sentiment for those who are in the high nativist
category. (The difference between those who are high nativist/low anti-elite (or HN/LAE) and
those who are high nativist/high anti-elite (or HN/HAE) is indicated in the second panel in
Table 1 in the row labeled HN/HAE - HN/LAE.) Interestingly, the difference between these
two groups gets marginally larger in the fully specified model compared to the sparsely spec-
ified model. The effect of anti-elite sentiment on support for leaving the EU is limited and
concentrated to those above the median on nativism.6
4Predicted probabilities are calculated using the margins command in Stata 14 (which uses the delta methods).
All other variables are help at their mean.
5The appendices contain several robustness tests. Appendix D shows results with the nativism and anti-
elite scales, and also shows the median split models with an interaction term instead of the categorical variable
approach we take here. In appendix E, we show that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion or coding of
the middle category of our dependent variable through multinomial models as well as dichotomous probit models
where we exclude the middle category, code the middle category as “remain”, or recode the middle category as
“leave.” Results are consistent across all of these alternate specifications.
6In appendix F, we demonstrate that the effect of anti-elite sentiment appears to be fairly linear among high
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Table 1: Support for the UK leaving the EU (Brexit)
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
March 2014 May 2014 June 2014 April 2015
Low nativist/High anti-elite -0.25∗ -0.02 -0.16 0.06 -0.15 0.02 -0.16 -0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
High nativist/Low anti-elite 0.91∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 1.00∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
High nativist/High anti-elite 1.23∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.04∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Authoritarianism 1.04∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.20) (0.22) (0.24)
Ideology 1.70∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.29)
University degree -0.16∗ -0.17∗ -0.20∗ -0.22∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Internal efficacy -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Economic sentiment* -0.31 -0.51∗ -0.45 -0.58∗
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.29)
Globalization negative 0.52∗∗∗ 0.38∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.33
(0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18)
British identity -0.12 -0.11 0.11 -0.18
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20)
Support for redistribution -0.45∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -0.44∗∗ -0.42∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Age 0.15 0.38 0.22 0.33
(0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.28)
Female 0.20∗∗ 0.16 0.14 0.19
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
London -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Scotland -0.32∗ -0.18 -0.07 -0.18
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19)
HN/LAE - LN-HAE 1.16∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
HN/HAE - LN-HAE 1.47∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
HN/HAE - HN/LAE 0.31∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Number of observations 1553 1553 1331 1331 1294 1294 938 938
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.21
∗p < 0.05,∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗∗p < 0.001. Ordered probit; Std. errors in parentheses; cutpoints omitted. LN-LAE is the excluded category.
*For the wave 5 model, economic sentiment is measured in Wave 5; for waves 6 & 7, economic sentiment is measured
in Wave 6; for Wave 8, economic sentiment is measured in Wave 8.
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Figure 1: Predicted probability of supporting “Leave” in EU referendum
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60%
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Low nativism High nativism
Low anti−elite High anti−elite Low anti−elite High anti−elite
Wave 8 (April 2015)
Predicted probability voting for UK to leave EU (Brexit)
All of the other variables have been rescaled from zero (0) to one (1), allowing one to roughly
compare the magnitude of coefficients (also true of the models in the appendices). The controls
and alternative explanations that matter are those that line up with previous research into
support for Euroskepticism.
Conclusion
The British public’s vote to leave the United Kingdom appears to have indeed been a nativist
reaction to the threat posed by the European Union. However, the anti-establishment votes
among those nativists seem to have a particularly strong antipathy to the European Union. As
we have argued, this indicates that Brexit was indeed a right-wing populist moment. Typically,
British resistance to further encroachments of EU authority was a function of leftist protectionist
sentiment and conservative concerns about erosions of national sovereignty. Our paper shows
nativists by separating the former variable into terciles (see Table 8 and Figure 2. This relationship can be seen
most clearly in Figure 1, which uses predicted probabilities calculated from the wave 8 (April 2015) saturated
model.
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that while the latter was still important in determining Brexit attitudes, right-wing populism
was indeed a potent force in the outcome.
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Appendix A: Survey question details and wording
In this section, we provide detailed information about question wording from the survey. In
some cases, we provide additional rationale why we included a variable and/or highlight our
expectations.
Brexit Referendum question
If there was a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, how would you vote?
-I would vote for Britain to remain a member of the European Union.
-I would vote for Britain to leave the European Union.
-I would not vote.
-Don’t know
This item is coded on three point scale, so that remain=1, don’t know=2, and leave=3. Our
primary analyses are robust to excluding don’t knows altogether, or coding them with either
remain or leave. See appendix E.
Anti-elitism questions
These questions were answered on a five point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly
disagree.
-Those we elect to public office usually try to keep the promises they made during the election.
-Most public officials can be trusted to do what is right without our having to constantly check
on them.
-You can generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right.
-Quite a few of the people running our government are not as honest as the voters have a right
to expect.
Nativism questions
These questions were answered on a five point Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly
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disagree. -Even in its milder forms, Islam is a serious danger to Western civilization.
-The United Kingdom has benefitted from the arrival in recent decades of people from many
different countries and cultures.
-All further immigration to the UK should be halted.
-The United Kingdom should allow more highly skilled immigrants from other countries to come
and live here.
-The United Kingdom should allow more low-skilled immigrants from other countries to come
and live here.
-Most crimes in Britain are committed by immigrants.
-Immigration in recent years has helped Britain’s economy grow faster than it would have done.
-The Government should encourage immigrants and their families to leave the United Kingdom
(including family members who were born in the UK).
-Local councils normally allow immigrant families to jump the queue in allocating council homes.
-Non-white British citizens who were born in this country are just as ‘British’ as white citizens
born in this country.
Authoritarianism
We measure authoritarianism using three questions, each of which is designed to approximately
tap one of the three components of Altemeyer (1996) tripartite conception of right-wing author-
itarianism (authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism), while also
emphasizing child rearing as an important window to measuring authoritarianism (see Feldman
and Stenner (1997), p. 747). These three questionsv which were asked in the first wave of our
study (November 2011), scale well together (Cronbach’s alpha .79). Authoritarians are likely
to oppose supranational institutions that restrict national sovereignty since they favor a strong
state to ensure law and order. These questions were answered on a five point Likert scale ranging
from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
-Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
-Our customs and national heritage are the things that have made us great, and certain people
should be made to show greater respect for them.
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-Parents and other authorities have forgotten that good old-fashioned physical punishment is
still one of the best ways to make people behave properly.
Globalization
One possibility is that support for a British exit from the European Union is driven less by
immediate economic perceptions, and is more rooted in beliefs about how globalization affects
the British economy. To examine and control for this possibility, we constructed a scale from
four questions that specifically tap how globalization affects aspects of the British economy.
Choices were negative effect, no effect, positive effect, or don’t know. This variable is coded so
that higher values indicate stronger beliefs that globalization harms the British economy. These
questions were asked in the second of our eight-wave panel.
Do you think globalisation, the increased trade between countries in goods, services, and invest-
ments, has had a negative effect, no effect, or a positive effect on each of the following?
-British factory workers -Multinational corporations based in the United Kingdom -You and
your immediate family -The British economy
Ideology
Political ideology is likely to predict Brexit attitudes. Since the late 1980s, it is well established
that conservatives have been highly resistant to further steps in European integration. We use
a left-right self-placement scale rather than party identification for concerns about endogeneity.
In particular, identifying with the United Kingdom Independence Party is essentially a measure
of pro-Brexit attitudes since the party’s main commitment is to leave the EU. (See Appendix H,
however, for a model that includes parties as potential givers of elite cues, in which our results
do not change.) The specific question wording we use is: “People sometimes use the labels ‘left’
or ‘left wing’ and ‘right’ or ‘right wing’ to describe political parties, party leaders, and political
ideas. Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means left and the end marked
10 means right, where would you place yourself on this scale?”
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Cognitive mobilization
Cognitive mobilization: Previous studies have examined whether high levels of cognitive mo-
bilization lead to more support for European integration as those with high level of political
awareness and well-developed cognitive skills are more likely to understand the integrative pro-
cess and feel less threated by it (Inglehart et al., 1987, Janssen, 1991, Tillman, 2013). Cognitive
mobilization is a very broad concept, so we include different ways to approach this question.
Our preferred measure of cognitive mobilization is a dichotomous variable capturing whether
or not a respondent has a university degree. We use the following question wording: “What is
the highest educational or work-related qualification you have?” and then separate respondents
into two categories.
Coded as not a university graduate:
-No formal qualifications
-Youth training certificate/skillseekers
-Recognized trade apprenticeship complet
-Clerical and commercial
-City and Guild certificate
-City and Guild certificate - advanced
-onc
-CSE grades 2-5
-CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, School
-Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate
-GCE A level or Higher Certificate
-Scottish Higher Certificate
-Nursing qualification (eg SEN, SRN, SCM
-Teaching qualification (not degree)
-University diploma7
7In British higher education terminology, a diploma is conferred upon someone who has finished coursework,
but did not earn enough credits for a Bachelor’s degree and has exhausted opportunities to retake or resit assessed
work. Therefore, we code this is not a university graduate.
19
-Don’t know -Refused
Coded as university graduate:
-University or CNAA first degree (eg BA, BSc)
-University or CNAA higher degree (eg MA, MSc)
-Other technical, professional or higher degree
Importantly, we take no position on whether a university education affects pro-EU attitudes via
providing the higher skill levels that allow one to thrive in the Single Market or via inculcating
pro-market values and beliefs (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).
We also include a measure of internal efficacy that captures self-reported understanding of pol-
itics. We construct this measure using the following questions:
-I feel that I could do as good of a job in public office as most other people.
-I think I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.
-I Don’t often feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics and government.
-I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our coun-
try.
-I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.
-Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really un-
derstand what’s going on.
Economic sentiment
Some argue that self-interest is a foundation of public opinion and that citizens are more likely
to support EU integration if the process brings feasible benefits to them or the national econ-
omy (Gabel and Palmer, 1995, Gabel, 1998, Gabel and Whitten, 1997, Anderson and Reichert,
1995, Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, Hakhverdian et al., 2013). To examine how economic senti-
ment affects support for the UK leaving the EU, we create an economic sentiment variable from
questions that tap egocentric and sociotropic assessment of both prospective and retrospective
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perceptions of the economy. These questions are then scaled into a single variable since they
are so strongly correlated. Because economic sentiment is a moving target, we use the most
temporally proximate questions available for each of our four measures assessing support for
Britain leaving the EU. (This is the only independent variable in our models that comes from
different waves). We use the following questions to construct wave-specific assessments of eco-
nomic sentiment. Responses are based on a five category Likert scale ranging from ”a lot better”
to ”a lot worse”:
-How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed over the last 12
months?
-How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months
ago?
-How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months?
-How do you think the general economic situation in this country will develop over the next 12
months?
National identity
Following the shift in the nature of the European project from a mostly economic to close political
cooperation, the criteria for evaluating the EU broadened to include symbolic political consider-
ations, such as feelings of national identity (Harteveld et al., 2013, Carey, 2002, McLaren, 2002,
Kritzinger, 2003). To measure British identity, we construct a scale using the following questions:
How important is being British to you?
-Not important at all
-Very unimportant
-Neither unimportant nor important/Don’t know
-Very important
-Extremely important
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How well does the term British describe you?
-Not at all
-Not very well
-Very well
-Extremely well
-Don’t know (recoded to as midpoint of answer categories)
When talking about Britons, how often do you say ‘we’ instead of ‘they’?
-Never
-Rarely
-Sometimes
-Quite Often
-Always
-Don’t know [dropped from analysis]
For me, to possess British citizenship is:
-Not important at all
-Very unimportant
-Neither unimportant nor important/Don’t know
-Very important
-Extremely important
Support for redistribution
One argument made against British being in the European Union is the financial cost of mem-
bership, and the fact that pays more into the EU than what it gets back in direct benefits. As a
consequence, we expect that those who are more supportive or redistributive policies generally
will be more supportive of remaining in the EU; that is, the redistributive nature of British
membership in the EU will not be as nearly as problematic for this group. This question is
coded such that higher values indicate more support for redistributive policies and was asked
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in the first our eight waves. The question is presented as a six point scale anchored by the two
following statements:
-Government should get out of the business of promoting income equality. -Government should
do more to reduce income inequality.
Additional control variables
Demographics: We include controls for age and sex. As with other variables, age has been
rescaled 0-1. We also include an indicator variable for female respondents.
Regional indicators: The June 23 referendum revealed two regions—Scotland and London—that
were outliers in strength of opposition to Brexit. We include indicators for these two regions in
case there is some residual variance not captured by our attitudinal and demographic variables.
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Appendix B: Variation of intention to vote “leave” or “stay” over
time
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
March 2014 May 2014 June 2014 April 2015
I would vote for Britain to remain
a member of the European Union.
40% 39% 39% 41%
I would vote for Britain to leave the
European Union.
40 39 39 38
I would not vote. 5 4 5 4
Don’t know 15 17 16 17
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Appendix C: Distribution of responses across nativism and anti-
elitism
Group
Cases Proportion
(Wave 5) (Unweighted, Wave 5)
Low nativist/Low anti-elite (LN-LAE) 523 34%
Low nativist/High anti-elite (LN-HAE) 284 18%
High nativist/Low anti-elite (HN-LAE) 335 22%
High nativist/High anti-elite (HN-HAE) 416 27%
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Appendix D: Models with alternate specifications of the indepen-
dent variables
Table 2: Alternative model specifications using the full nativism and anti-elite scales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8 Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
Nativism (full scale) 2.774∗∗∗ 2.774∗∗∗ 3.021∗∗∗ 2.750∗∗∗ 0.688 0.991 1.156 2.567+
(0.235) (0.248) (0.251) (0.309) (0.930) (1.041) (1.129) (1.329)
Anti-elite (full scale) 0.557∗ 0.689∗∗ 0.592∗ 0.641∗ -0.679 -0.369 -0.508 0.532
(0.218) (0.233) (0.231) (0.273) (0.578) (0.646) (0.702) (0.802)
Nativism * Anti-elite 2.222∗ 1.896+ 1.983+ 0.191
(0.975) (1.099) (1.188) (1.363)
Authoritarianism 0.748∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗ 0.801∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗ 0.800∗∗
(0.192) (0.216) (0.236) (0.261) (0.193) (0.216) (0.235) (0.260)
Ideology 1.576∗∗∗ 1.234∗∗∗ 1.196∗∗∗ 1.267∗∗∗ 1.577∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗ 1.266∗∗∗
(0.216) (0.235) (0.249) (0.310) (0.216) (0.235) (0.249) (0.310)
University degree -0.127+ -0.138+ -0.155+ -0.176+ -0.123 -0.137+ -0.153+ -0.177+
(0.0763) (0.0809) (0.0823) (0.0972) (0.0761) (0.0808) (0.0821) (0.0970)
Internal -0.0169 -0.0460 0.0102 -0.00753 -0.0211 -0.0511 0.00343 -0.00757
(0.0515) (0.0555) (0.0591) (0.0714) (0.0521) (0.0558) (0.0590) (0.0715)
Economic sentiment -0.166 -0.363 -0.303 -0.379 -0.155 -0.361 -0.297 -0.378
(0.222) (0.237) (0.241) (0.299) (0.225) (0.239) (0.243) (0.299)
Globalization neg. 0.410∗∗ 0.275+ 0.434∗∗ 0.255 0.419∗∗ 0.280+ 0.429∗ 0.254
(0.148) (0.157) (0.168) (0.188) (0.148) (0.157) (0.168) (0.188)
British identiy -0.0920 -0.108 0.117 -0.203 -0.0995 -0.114 0.105 -0.206
(0.162) (0.176) (0.182) (0.206) (0.164) (0.178) (0.183) (0.206)
Support redistribution -0.300∗ -0.397∗∗ -0.291∗ -0.293+ -0.291∗ -0.385∗∗ -0.280+ -0.292+
(0.128) (0.140) (0.148) (0.173) (0.129) (0.139) (0.148) (0.173)
Age 0.109 0.354 0.135 0.289 0.113 0.355+ 0.138 0.291
(0.198) (0.215) (0.238) (0.283) (0.198) (0.215) (0.236) (0.282)
Female 0.176∗ 0.112 0.0746 0.157 0.175∗ 0.111 0.0748 0.157
(0.0761) (0.0807) (0.0843) (0.102) (0.0761) (0.0807) (0.0842) (0.102)
London -0.112 -0.0996 -0.0351 0.0336 -0.105 -0.0938 -0.0341 0.0347
(0.0977) (0.110) (0.122) (0.122) (0.0977) (0.110) (0.122) (0.122)
Scotland -0.305∗ -0.179 -0.0786 -0.194 -0.297∗ -0.170 -0.0694 -0.193
(0.133) (0.149) (0.151) (0.188) (0.134) (0.149) (0.151) (0.188)
N 1553 1331 1294 938 1553 1331 1294 938
Probit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Cut points omitted.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3: Alternate model specifications using median splits and interaction (in place of categorical vari-
ables only)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
Nativism (median split) 0.591∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.0932) (0.0990) (0.104) (0.125)
Anti-elite (median split) -0.0176 0.0596 0.0185 -0.00470
(0.104) (0.115) (0.117) (0.134)
Nativism median * Antielite median 0.370∗∗ 0.341∗ 0.390∗ 0.442∗
(0.143) (0.156) (0.156) (0.185)
Authoritarianism 1.042∗∗∗ 1.301∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.202) (0.222) (0.242)
Ideology 1.698∗∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗ 1.380∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.227) (0.241) (0.291)
University degree -0.164∗ -0.172∗ -0.201∗ -0.215∗
(0.0752) (0.0802) (0.0813) (0.0977)
Internal efficacy -0.0423 -0.0561 -0.00825 -0.0175
(0.0508) (0.0549) (0.0573) (0.0709)
Economic sentiment -0.306 -0.510∗ -0.450+ -0.581∗
(0.212) (0.230) (0.235) (0.288)
Globalization negative 0.522∗∗∗ 0.375∗ 0.534∗∗ 0.332+
(0.143) (0.152) (0.163) (0.185)
British identify -0.120 -0.109 0.107 -0.179
(0.157) (0.170) (0.177) (0.200)
Support redistribution -0.449∗∗∗ -0.510∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗ -0.421∗
(0.127) (0.137) (0.143) (0.169)
Age 0.152 0.377+ 0.215 0.331
(0.196) (0.214) (0.232) (0.281)
Female 0.202∗∗ 0.157+ 0.135 0.194+
(0.0757) (0.0806) (0.0838) (0.102)
London -0.108 -0.0972 -0.0426 0.0417
(0.0954) (0.108) (0.114) (0.121)
Scotland -0.319∗ -0.184 -0.0736 -0.177
(0.131) (0.146) (0.147) (0.187)
N 1553 1331 1294 938
Probit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Cut points omitted.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix E: Alternative model specifications: multinomial logit
and dichotomous codings of the dependent variable
Table 4: Multinomial logit (“Leave” baseline/reference category)
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
Remain DK Remain DK Remain DK Remain DK
Low nativism/High anti-elite -0.00144 -0.201 -0.241 -0.660* -0.0591 -0.120 0.118 0.275
-0.226 -0.277 (0.255) (0.305) (0.257) (0.323) (0.316) (0.371)
High nativism/Low anti-elite -1.220*** -0.471* -1.380*** -0.852*** -1.232*** -0.669** -1.284*** -0.908**
-0.199 -0.225 (0.219) (0.244) (0.217) (0.259) (0.255) (0.331)
High nativism/High anti-elite -1.943*** -0.941*** -2.095*** -1.556*** -2.114*** -0.984*** -2.187*** -1.213***
-0.227 -0.246 (0.244) (0.275) (0.246) (0.277) (0.273) (0.341)
Authoritarianism -2.058*** -1.428** -2.691*** -1.621** -2.225*** -2.033*** -2.293*** -1.500*
-0.397 -0.474 (0.442) (0.499) (0.453) (0.570) (0.522) (0.618)
Ideology -3.397*** -1.103* -2.834*** -1.188* -2.854*** -0.793 -2.865*** -1.705**
-0.443 -0.455 (0.493) (0.516) (0.520) (0.506) (0.616) (0.607)
University degree 0.343* -0.0559 0.366* -0.104 0.423* -0.0369 0.415* -0.00953
-0.16 -0.187 (0.173) (0.204) (0.173) (0.205) (0.209) (0.253)
Internal efficacy 0.158 -0.649*** 0.109 -0.646*** 0.0644 -0.629*** 0.0793 -0.600***
-0.114 -0.127 (0.126) (0.140) (0.129) (0.143) (0.162) (0.165)
Economic sentiment 0.609 0.105 1.085* 0.0665 1.090* -0.220 1.222* 0.931
-0.463 -0.5 (0.512) (0.523) (0.528) (0.554) (0.611) (0.716)
Globalization negative -1.143*** -0.752* -0.849* -0.463 -1.104** -0.376 -0.712+ -0.155
-0.306 -0.346 (0.331) (0.392) (0.339) (0.394) (0.384) (0.434)
British identity 0.144 -0.063 0.117 0.0723 -0.363 -0.357 0.215 -0.774
-0.336 -0.359 (0.369) (0.426) (0.380) (0.419) (0.435) (0.526)
Support redistribution 0.949*** 0.199 1.037*** 0.151 0.991** 0.0350 0.928** -0.254
-0.267 -0.302 (0.296) (0.325) (0.306) (0.321) (0.360) (0.420)
Age -0.388 -2.296*** -1.036* -2.520*** -0.719 -2.825*** -0.792 -2.304**
-0.435 -0.506 (0.484) (0.548) (0.500) (0.591) (0.622) (0.746)
Female -0.426** 0.559** -0.355* 0.156 -0.315+ 0.106 -0.377+ 0.402
-0.159 -0.194 (0.176) (0.203) (0.179) (0.209) (0.217) (0.256)
London 0.215 -0.00945 0.198 -0.255 0.116 -0.134 -0.0703 -0.200
-0.206 -0.244 (0.233) (0.280) (0.229) (0.302) (0.260) (0.349)
Scotland 0.631* -0.24 0.439 -0.0656 0.172 -0.0644 0.457 0.204
-0.265 -0.349 (0.300) (0.337) (0.303) (0.342) (0.389) (0.412)
Constant 3.185*** 4.299*** 3.657*** 5.145*** 3.667*** 5.377*** 3.132*** 4.727***
-0.699 -0.786 (0.763) (0.869) (0.789) (0.860) (0.903) (1.063)
N 1553 1331 1294 938
Standard errors in parentheses. Cut points omitted. LN-LAE is the excluded category.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Alternate model specifications with binary dependent variable (excluding “don’t know” re-
sponses)
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
Low nativism/High anti-elite 0.00420 0.142 0.0480 -0.0523
(0.129) (0.145) (0.148) (0.180)
High nativism/Low anti-elite 0.742∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.129) (0.129) (0.153)
High nativism/High anti-elite 1.108∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗ 1.244∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.141) (0.144) (0.156)
Authoritarianism 1.134∗∗∗ 1.566∗∗∗ 1.263∗∗∗ 1.327∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.254) (0.272) (0.301)
Ideology 1.815∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗∗ 1.572∗∗∗ 1.531∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.269) (0.283) (0.332)
University degree -0.227∗ -0.240∗ -0.245∗ -0.227+
(0.0933) (0.101) (0.101) (0.121)
Internal efficacy -0.105 -0.00849 -0.0664 -0.0289
(0.0652) (0.0717) (0.0725) (0.0909)
Economic sentiment -0.259 -0.513+ -0.534+ -0.656+
(0.261) (0.285) (0.301) (0.342)
Globalization negative 0.648∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗ 0.625∗∗ 0.457∗
(0.175) (0.190) (0.190) (0.210)
British identify -0.0830 -0.0324 0.152 -0.0654
(0.198) (0.215) (0.223) (0.256)
Support redistribution -0.545∗∗∗ -0.554∗∗ -0.615∗∗∗ -0.477∗
(0.152) (0.169) (0.172) (0.204)
Age 0.218 0.581∗ 0.499+ 0.220
(0.261) (0.283) (0.287) (0.360)
Female 0.233∗ 0.238∗ 0.196+ 0.217+
(0.0922) (0.102) (0.103) (0.122)
London -0.137 -0.128 -0.103 0.0577
(0.120) (0.141) (0.132) (0.151)
Scotland -0.322∗ -0.297+ -0.124 -0.293
(0.153) (0.170) (0.177) (0.220)
(0.406) (0.447) (0.453) (0.525)
N 1305 1115 1098 793
Probit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Model constant omitted. LN-LAE is the excluded category.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6: Alternate model specifications with binary dependent variable (recoding “don’t know” responses
to remain)
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
High Nativism/Low anti-elite 0.00110 0.193 0.0250 -0.104
(0.119) (0.133) (0.136) (0.164)
High nativism/Low anti-elite 0.562∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.115) (0.117) (0.142)
High nativism/High anti-elite 0.911∗∗∗ 1.121∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.120) (0.121) (0.138)
Authoritarianism 1.100∗∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗ 1.199∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.228) (0.235) (0.273)
Ideology 1.543∗∗∗ 1.337∗∗∗ 1.258∗∗∗ 1.477∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.245) (0.250) (0.298)
University degree -0.131 -0.128 -0.158+ -0.176
(0.0830) (0.0905) (0.0907) (0.112)
Internal efficacy 0.0927 0.113+ 0.115+ 0.112
(0.0568) (0.0627) (0.0638) (0.0784)
Economic sentiment -0.224 -0.374 -0.261 -0.599+
(0.231) (0.251) (0.262) (0.319)
Globalization negative 0.576∗∗∗ 0.406∗ 0.507∗∗ 0.322
(0.155) (0.173) (0.172) (0.197)
British identity -0.0825 -0.0952 0.138 0.0458
(0.169) (0.191) (0.192) (0.223)
Support redistribution -0.394∗∗ -0.406∗∗ -0.354∗ -0.268
(0.136) (0.151) (0.150) (0.182)
Age 0.640∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.726∗
(0.228) (0.253) (0.255) (0.336)
Female 0.0424 0.0942 0.0841 0.0753
(0.0826) (0.0909) (0.0919) (0.113)
London -0.101 -0.0142 -0.0235 0.0738
(0.108) (0.123) (0.118) (0.142)
Scotland -0.213 -0.152 -0.0555 -0.216
(0.137) (0.151) (0.155) (0.198)
Constant -2.640∗∗∗ -3.033∗∗∗ -3.047∗∗∗ -2.728∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.389) (0.402) (0.472)
N 1553 1331 1294 938
Probit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Model constant omitted. LN-LAE is the excluded category.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 7: Alternate model specifications with binary dependent variable (recoding “don’t know” responses
to leave)
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
Low nativism/High anti-elite -0.0243 -0.0170 0.0164 0.0413
(0.113) (0.123) (0.130) (0.150)
High nativism/Low anti-elite 0.652∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.115) (0.116) (0.137)
High nativism/High anti-elite 0.983∗∗∗ 0.939∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.128) (0.131) (0.147)
Authoritarianism 0.938∗∗∗ 1.210∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.225) (0.265) (0.274)
Ideology 1.746∗∗∗ 1.368∗∗∗ 1.484∗∗∗ 1.325∗∗∗
(0.231) (0.248) (0.264) (0.321)
University degree -0.214∗ -0.236∗∗ -0.250∗∗ -0.240∗
(0.0842) (0.0892) (0.0908) (0.107)
Internal efficacy -0.215∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗ -0.165∗ -0.158∗
(0.0580) (0.0629) (0.0662) (0.0795)
Economic sentiment -0.368 -0.638∗ -0.698∗∗ -0.553+
(0.241) (0.261) (0.269) (0.316)
Globalization negative 0.500∗∗ 0.391∗ 0.568∗∗ 0.385+
(0.161) (0.171) (0.184) (0.199)
British identity -0.108 -0.0517 0.126 -0.308
(0.182) (0.193) (0.205) (0.237)
Support redistribution -0.519∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ -0.574∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗
(0.142) (0.154) (0.165) (0.192)
Age -0.302 -0.0838 -0.306 -0.124
(0.231) (0.251) (0.285) (0.313)
Female 0.357∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗ 0.199∗ 0.298∗∗
(0.0835) (0.0894) (0.0929) (0.110)
London -0.128 -0.180 -0.0839 0.0118
(0.107) (0.119) (0.133) (0.131)
Scotland -0.405∗∗ -0.250 -0.109 -0.191
(0.140) (0.156) (0.160) (0.200)
Constnat -0.531 -0.470 -0.466 -0.374
(0.351) (0.384) (0.385) (0.459)
N 1553 1331 1294 938
Probit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Model constant omitted. LN-LAE is the excluded category.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix F: Effect of anti-elitism on likelihood of voting “leave”
appears linear among high nativists
Table 8: Alternate specification with anti-elitism broken into terciles
Wave 8 Wave 8
Low nativism (median split)/Mid anti-elite (tercile split) 0.07 (0.15)
Low nativism (median split)/High anti-elite (tercile split) -0.03 (0.17)
High nativism (median split)/Low anti-elite (tercile split) 0.67∗∗∗ (0.14)
High nativism (median split)/Mid anti-elite (tercile split) 0.90∗∗∗ (0.16)
High nativism (median split)/High anti-elite (tercile split) 1.15∗∗∗ (0.13)
Nativism (median split) 0.41+ (0.21)
Anti-elite (tercile split) -0.00 (0.08)
Nativism (median) * Antielite (tercile) 0.24∗ (0.11)
Authoritarianism 1.05∗∗∗ (0.24) 1.05∗∗∗ (0.24)
Ideology 1.47∗∗∗ (0.29) 1.47∗∗∗ (0.29)
University degree -0.21∗ (0.10) -0.21∗ (0.10)
Internal efficacy -0.02 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07)
Economic sentiment -0.61∗ (0.29) -0.60∗ (0.29)
Globalization negative 0.31+ (0.18) 0.32+ (0.18)
British identity -0.17 (0.20) -0.17 (0.20)
Support redistribution -0.40∗ (0.17) -0.40∗ (0.17)
Age 0.31 (0.28) 0.32 (0.28)
Female 0.19+ (0.10) 0.19+ (0.10)
London 0.04 (0.12) 0.04 (0.12)
Scotland -0.18 (0.19) -0.18 (0.19)
N 938 938
Ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses. Cutpoints omitted. Low nativism-low anti-elite is the excluded category.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 2: Predicted probability of supporting “Leave” in EU referendum
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Appendix G: Brexit was not a left-wing populist phenomenon
To test the possibility that Brexit might have garnered support from left as well as right-wing
populists, we tested for another interaction, between our anti-elitist measures as well as a mea-
sure measuring anti-capitalist sentiment created from two additional survey items (‘Corporate
greed is a major problem in Britain’ and ‘British banks are making excessive profits at the
expense of ordinary people’.) These items were measured along a five-point Likert scale ranging
from strongly disagree to strongly agree and were asked in wave 7. (Because these items come
from wave 7, we only use the dependent variable from waves 7 and 8.) We again created four
categories of respondents based on median splits. Those low in anti-capitalism and low in anti-
elitism serve as the excluded category and the baseline for comparison. Results show no effect
of the interaction between the two items on support or opposition to Brexit. Those who are
high in anticapitalism and high in anti-elite attitudes are actually less likely to support Brexit
than those with low anti-elite attitudes who are also high in anticapitalism.
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Table 9: Alternate model: Testing for the effect of left-wing populism by substituting anti-capitalist
sentiment for nativism
Wave 7 Wave 8
Low anti-capitalist/High anti-elite 0.452∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗
(0.118) (0.147)
High anti-capitalist/Low anti-elite 0.108 -0.0407
(0.112) (0.129)
High anti-capitalist/High anti-elite 0.354∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗
(0.0997) (0.121)
Authoritarianism 1.469∗∗∗ 1.491∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.249)
Ideology 1.576∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.316)
University degree -0.290∗∗∗ -0.315∗∗
(0.0798) (0.0975)
Internal efficacy 0.00899 0.0172
(0.0575) (0.0710)
Economic sentiment -0.568∗ -0.647∗
(0.229) (0.300)
Globalization negative 0.718∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗
(0.164) (0.192)
British identity 0.203 -0.0825
(0.180) (0.214)
Support redistribution -0.569∗∗∗ -0.577∗∗
(0.146) (0.189)
Age 0.414+ 0.526+
(0.234) (0.282)
Female 0.158+ 0.240∗
(0.0832) (0.104)
London -0.116 -0.0444
(0.116) (0.120)
Scotland -0.0717 -0.165
(0.147) (0.194)
N 1294 918
Ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses. Cut points omitted. Low anticapitalism/low anti-elitism is the excluded category.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix H: Results are robust to the inclusion of party identi-
fication as an elite cue
Hooghe and Marks (2005) offer an approach to explaining public opinion on European integration
that includes the importance of elite cues. Given that the integration process is difficult to
understand, ordinary voters look to particular elites to offer them guidance about how to think.
Below we incorporate partisan identification into our model, a typical way of exploring such
effects. Using the United Kingdom Independence Party as the baseline, we do find partisan
effects. However, our main variables of interest continue to matter.
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Table 10
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
Low nativism/High anti-elite -0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.02
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
High nativism/Low anti-elite 0.55∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
High nativism/High anti-elite 0.86∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Authoritarianism 1.05∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 1.02∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.25)
Ideology 1.26∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.90∗∗
(0.24) (0.25) (0.27) (0.33)
University degree -0.15 -0.19∗ -0.21∗ -0.23∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Internal efficacy -0.04 -0.07 -0.00 -0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Economic sentiment -0.36 -0.69∗∗ -0.57∗ -0.71∗
(0.22) (0.24) (0.25) (0.30)
Globalization negative 0.54∗∗∗ 0.39∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.33
(0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19)
British identity -0.04 -0.06 0.19 -0.18
(0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21)
Support redistribution -0.33∗ -0.40∗∗ -0.32∗ -0.36∗
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17)
Age 0.14 0.27 0.21 0.26
(0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.29)
Female 0.18∗ 0.12 0.11 0.16
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
London -0.14 -0.14 -0.07 0.01
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
Scotland -0.44∗∗ -0.22 -0.18 -0.22
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23)
BNP 0.20 4.02∗∗∗ -0.27 -0.92
(0.38) (0.43) (0.49) (0.57)
Tory -0.54∗ -1.05∗∗ -0.79∗∗ -0.69∗
(0.23) (0.36) (0.27) (0.31)
None/DK/Other -0.59∗ -1.34∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗ -0.96∗∗
(0.23) (0.36) (0.27) (0.31)
Labour -0.92∗∗∗ -1.67∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗∗ -1.14∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.36) (0.27) (0.32)
Liberal Democrats -1.34∗∗∗ -1.86∗∗∗ -1.74∗∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.38) (0.30) (0.34)
SNP -0.94 -5.43∗∗∗ -4.86∗∗∗ -4.85∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.44) (0.40) (0.43)
Plaid -0.25 -1.12∗ -0.50 -0.80
(0.34) (0.44) (0.37) (0.47)
Green -0.86∗∗ -1.48∗∗∗ -1.32∗∗∗ -1.25∗∗
(0.31) (0.42) (0.37) (0.42)
N 1553 1331 1294 938
Ordered probit. Standard errors in parentheses. Cutpoints omitted. UKIP is the excluded category for party.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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